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JUDICIAL ACTIVISM CONSTRUCTS LENDERS'
NIGHTMARE - Embree Construction Group, Inc. v.
Raftor, Inc. and United Carolina Bank'
INTRODUCTION
In North Carolina, contractors can recover amounts earned
from delinquent owners through the use of a "mechanic's lien."' 2 A
mechanic's lien is a statutorily created lien right that applies in the
construction industry to laborers, materialmen, and others who
have rendered goods or services for improvement of the owner's
real property.' A properly filed and perfected mechanic's lien
secures for the lien holder priority of payment of the price or value
of work performed and materials furnished in constructing the
project.4 Where corporate bankruptcy is commonplace, a lien
holder's priority of payment often means the commercial contrac-
tor gets paid where other creditors do not.
Prior to the decision in Embree Construction Group, Inc. v.
Rafcor, Inc, the mechanics' lien statute provided a contractor's sole
remedy should payment for his goods and services not be volunta-
rily forthcoming.' North Carolina's courts would typically provide
no equitable relief for contractors, relying almost solely on the pro-
visions contained in this state's applicable mechanics' lien
statutes.6
Thus, under North Carolina law as it existed prior to the case
Embree. v. Rafcor, a contractor in privity with an insolvent owner
had only one remedy: the statutory mechanic's lien. Even though
the lender received all the security it had bargained for in the form
1. Embree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 411 S.E.2d
916 (1992).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 to 13 (1989). In this Note, the terms "mechanic's
lien," "lien statute," and "Chapter 44A" shall be used interchangeably.
3. Id.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 981 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Note that "attachment" relief may be granted in conjunction with a lien
judgment. See JAMES A. WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH
CAROLINA § 424(b) (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr., eds., 3d ed.
1988) (hereinafter Webster).
6. Embree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 418, 424,
388 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1990)(Greene, J., dissenting)(Embree I).
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of a completed building and even if there remained funds in the
construction account with which to compensate unpaid builders,
the contractor could generally not compel payment from the con-
struction loan funds held by the lender.7 Since a lien does not nec-
essarily insure payment of an outstanding debt, strict application
of the policy that the applicable mechanics' lien statute provides a
builders sole remedy could, in instances such as in Embree v.
Rafcor, result in apparent injustice.
In the typical commercial construction scenario, the real prop-
erty owner, which is quite frequently a corporation, will borrow
funds for construction of a commercial facility. The lender requires
the borrower/real property owner to give a priority mortgage on
the real property and any attachments to that real property. Typi-
cally, only after the lender has secured its mortgage will it disburse
the monies necessary to allow construction to begin. Due to the
high costs of commercial construction, real property owners rarely
begin construction before the loan is approved and the mortgage
has been given. Accordingly, upon perfection, the lender's mort-
gage will take priority over any subsequently arising rising
mechanic's lien. In instances where the real property owner be-
comes insolvent during construction of the commercial facility, the
lender receives payment first. Only after the lender receives full
payment may the contractor receive payment. In bankruptcy, as-
sets often may be dissipated before all lenders receive full pay-
ment. The contractor, after considerable expense, time and effort
could very well leave empty-handed.
In 1992 the North Carolina Court of Appeals faced just such a
dilemma in the case of Embree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor,
Inc." The court chose to grant an equitable mechanic's lien after
reaching the conclusion that a strict application of the scheme un-
derlying the North Carolina statutory mechanic's lien could lead to
an unjust result. The injustice of the strict application of the
mechanic's lien statute lay in the fact that whereas a contractor
might recover nothing after incurring considerable expense to com-
plete the construction of a commercial facility, other entities could
7. Id. at 786-87. In that case the Court stated that "[w]hatever rights, there-
fore, in respect to a lien upon the property in construction of which, or furnishing
materials or performing labor thereof, said creditors may have, if any, is depen-
dent upon the statutes of this state." In effect, the Court stated that the only
remedies available were those arising from the state's statutes.
8. Embree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 411 S.E.2d
916 (1992).
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and often did recover at least partial repayment of monies ex-
pended for the completion of the same project.
While North Carolina courts do grant equitable relief in cer-
tain situations, it is rare for them to grant equitable relief in the
form of an equitable lien.9 Black's Law Dictionary defines an equi-
table lien as
[a] right, not existing at law, to have specific property applied in
whole or in part to payment of a particular debt or class of
debts. . . . An equitable lien arises either from a written contract
which shows an intention to charge some particular property with
a debt or obligation or is implied and declared by a court of eq-
uity out of general considerations of right and justice as applied
to relations of the parties and circumstances of their dealings."10
Even following the decision in Embree, an equitable lien will
still not arise where (a) the construction is incomplete or (b) the
lender disburses all the loan funds to the borrower, who diverts the
funds to purposes other than paying the contractor.1 However, in
certain situations where previously the contractor would have been
unable to collect monies owed for work on a project, Embree may
now enable contractors to collect in spite of the owner's insolvency
and prior encumbrances on the owner's property.
This Note will offer a brief history of the case law developed
prior to Embree and will analyze the rationale used by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in order to make their determination to
grant an equitable remedy in this particular case. Next, this Note
will examine the holding in Embree and will advance the proposi-
tion that the holding in that case is a departure from pre:existing
law and cannot be easily reconciled with the case law developed in
earlier North Carolina decisions and decisions of Federal Courts
applying North Carolina law. Finally, this Note will outline the po-
tential problems in litigation that may arise as a result of the deci-
sion in Embree, and will conclude with suggestions for attorneys to
consider in light of the new development in North Carolina law
from the standpoint of helping assemble construction loan
packages.
9. Garrison v. Vermont Mills, 154 N.C. 1, 69 S.E. 743 (1910).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (6TH ED. 1990).
11. Embree at 495-96, 411 S.E.2d at 922-23 n.3.
1992]
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THE CASE
On October 20, 1987, the plaintiff/contractor, Embree Con-
struction Group, Inc., ("Embree Construction"), contracted with
defendant/owner, Rafcor, Inc., ("Rafcor"), to construct a restau-
rant building for Rafcor." Rafcor mortgaged the property to co-
defendant/lender, United Carolina Bank, ("UCB"), for a construc-
tion loan of $942,500." Embree Construction applied to Rafcor for
periodic progress payments during the entire course of construc-
tion. 1 Rafcor would send this application to UCB who would then
disburse the funds from the loan amount. 15 Embree Construction
completed the construction in March of 1988.16 Embree Construc-
tion then applied to Rafcor for its final two payments.17 Even
though $70,000 remained in the loan fund,18 UCB did not honor
Embree Construction's direct requests. 9 While Embree Construc-
tion properly filed its Notice of Claim of Lien, it did not pursue an
action to enforce the lien. 0 Since Embree Construction failed to
meet the statute's enforcement requirement, its lien on the real
property expired.21
On November 17, 1988, Embree Construction brought action
12. Id. at 489, 411 S.E.2d at 919.
13. Embree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 411
S.E.2d 916 (1992).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Embree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 411
S.E.2d 916 (1992).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 491, 411 S.E.2d at 920 n.1, which states in pertinent part, "In its
brief UCB argues that plaintiff [Embree Construction Company] filed a claim of
lien on 1 July 1988 but failed to perfect the lien within 180 days. Had plaintiff
perfected its claim, it could have forced a sale of the improved property and thus
'would have been protected to the extent intended by Chapter 44A.' Plaintiff re-
sponds that because UCB's mortgage interest was superior to plaintiff's lien,
plaintiff's interest was cut off, virtually obliterating any likelihood plaintiff would
collect either the $110,383 it was owed or the $70,000 remaining in the loan fund.
UCB did in fact foreclose on the property on 30 December 1988, effectively cut-
ting off any subordinate liens. In addition, the contract between plaintiff and
Rafcor stated final payment would not become due until all liens arising out of
the contract were released."
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-13 (1989). The statute requires a lien judgment in
order to direct the sale of the real property and for the proceeds to be applied
against the lien amount.
[Vol. 15:77
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against Rafcor and UCB (together, "Defendants"). 22 Embree Con-
struction alleged that Defendants owed it $110,383 for the com-
pleted construction project. 23 Embree Construction argued that
since UCB received all the security for which it bargained - a com-
pleted building - yet did not disburse the remaining $70,000 in the
loan fund, UCB was unjustly enriched at Embree Construction's
expense. 4 Therefore, Embree Construction argued that an equita-
ble lien existed on the loan fund.25
The Superior Court granted Defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss reasoning that Embree Construction's remedies were lim-
ited to those provided by the lien statute. 6 The lien statute re-
quires a lien holder to file an enforcement action in order to en-
force its lien. The lien statute does not expressly provide any
remedy where a lien holder fails to meet all the requirements in
filing and perfecting its lien. Since Embree failed to file an enforce-
ment action, Embree's lien expired. Since Embree's lien expired
and the statute does not expressly provide for any other remedy
beyond the statutory lien, the Superior Court held that Embree
Construction failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.'
On appeal, Embree Construction argued that North Carolina's
lien statute was not to the exclusion of all other remedies, but
rather in addition to other remedies.28 The majority of a divided
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court. 9 The Court of Appeals
held that, even where the contractor is not in privity with the
lender, the contractor has an equitable lien against construction
loan funds held by the lender.30 The majority for the Court of Ap-
22. Plaintiff also sued Anthony J. Sapienza, Ronald Thomas Tedesco and
Frederick Anthony Occhino, directors of Rafcor, Inc., and as against them in-
cluded a claim of tortious interference with a contract. This Note will not address
the merits of this claim.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 17 and 18. The amount of $110,383
included $32,973 for extra work performed and costs of delay.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 491, 411 S.E.2d at 920.
26. Id. at 490, 411 S.E.2d at 919.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 492-93, 411 S.E.2d at 921.
29. Id. at 490, 411 S.E.2d at 919.
30. Embree Constr. Co. v. Rafcor, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 418, 424, 388 S.E.2d 604,
608 (1990). Judge Greene dissented stating that North Carolina's mechanics' lien
statute provided the only remedy available and that the remedy was adequate in
this case.
1992]
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peals reasoned that there were instances where the legal remedy
proved insufficient. 1 In such instances, unless the legislature ex-
plicitly provides to the contrary, North Carolina's courts should
continue to grant equitable relief in the interest of justice.2
Defendants appealed, arguing that North Carolina's lien pro-
cedures were created expressly for this type of situation,3 that the
mechanic's lien was Embree Construction's sole remedy, 34 and
since Embree Construction failed to undertake the necessary steps
to enforce the lien,35 Embree Construction's claims should be dis-
missed.36 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision to grant an equitable lien on the undisbursed
loan funds.3 7 The Supreme Court ruled that the mechanics' lien
statute did not expressly exclude equitable remedies.38 Therefore,
Embree Construction stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted and equity could require that the defendants give restitu-
tion to Embree Construction. Since the defendant, UCB, unjustly
enriched itself at Embree Construction's expense, Embree Con-
struction could be entitled to an equitable lien on the undisbursed
construction loan funds held by UCB. '0
BACKGROUND
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF CHAPTER 44A LIEN
The statutory scheme of Chapter 44A protects the interests of
builders and materialmen.41 In order to recover under the lien stat-
ute, contractors must meet five basic filing and enforcement re-
quirements.42 First, the contractor must render goods or services
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 3 and 4.
34. Id.
35. See supra text accompanying note 20.
36. Id. Embree Construction did file a claim of lien but did not pursue an
enforcement action; thus, Embree Construction's claim of lien against Rafcor's
property expired.
37. Embree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 489, 411
S.E.2d 916, 918 (1992).
38. Id. at 492, 411 S.E.2d at 921.
39. Id. at 497, 411 S.E.2d at 923.
40. Id.
41. The term "contractors" shall be used to generically refer to those "build-
ers" and "materialmen" protected under Chapter 44A's Lien Statute.
42. WEBSTER, supra note 5, at § 418 to 24.
[Vol. 15:77
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pursuant to an express or implied contract with the owner of the
real property."3 The contract need not be in writing." Second, the
contractor's performance must be for the improvement of the
owner's real property. 45 Third, a Claim of Lien must be filed "not
later than 120 days from the last furnishing of labor or materials at
the site of the improvement" by the lien claimant .4 This "Claim of
Lien" must be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Superior Court
in the county where the real property subject to the claim is lo-
cated.47 Fourth, an action to enforce the lien must be "[com-
menced within] 180 days after the last furnishing of labor or
materials at the site of the improvement" by the lien claimant.48
This "enforcement action" may be instituted in any county
wherein the "Claim of Lien" was filed.49 Where the lien claimant
fails to file an enforcement action within this period, the lien ex-
pires.50 Fifth, the law requires a judgment to be entered for the
amount recoverable. The judgment amount may not to exceed the
amount stated in the lien. The judgment should direct "a sale of
the real property subject to the lien." 1 In order for the judgment
to be in proper, enforceable form, the court must render a judg-
ment amount and order the sale of the real property to satisfy that
amount.2 The judgment amount cannot exceed the amount
claimed in the "Claim of Lien."53 Whether or not the construction
is complete or the funds are due, the lien secures the lien claim-
ant's rights to amounts earned. Where the contractor is in privity
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1989).
44. Id.
45. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 421, at 547-48. The authors state that North
Carolina's Legislature has defined "improvement" in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-7
(1989).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12(b) (1989).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12(a) (1989). The statute requires "substantial
compliance" with the suggested Claim of Lien form that is found in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 44A-12(c) (1989). See also WEBSTER, supra note 5, at § 423(c).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-13(a) (1989).
49. Id.
50. WEBSTER, supra note 5, at § 424(b). Also note that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-
15 (1989) allows "attachment of the property subject to the lien" where the owner
of the real property removes, attempts to remove, or threatens to remove an im-
provement from the real property subject to the lien without the lien claimant's
written consent.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-13(b) (1989).
52. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 424(e) at 558-60.
53. Id.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 to 18(5) (1989).
1992]
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with the insolvent owner,. but not the lender, and the contractor
seeks payment from the loan funds held by the lender, Chapter
44A offers no relief 5 This is because there exists no contract be-
tween the lender and the contractor; such a contract is a key ele-
ment in a Chapter 44A lien."
REALITIES OF COMMERCIAL PRACTICE
Since the real property owner of a commercial site often owes
the contractor large sums of money, commercial contractors gener-
ally file claim of liens in the ordinary course of business.5 7 Where
necessary, the contractor will continue with an enforcement action
and eventually obtain a judgment demanding the sale of the prop-
erty to satisfy the outstanding judgment amount. 58 Typically, in
the commercial construction setting, there are several lien claim-
ants and creditors who await payment.5 9 In order to ensure that
laborers and materialmen get paid, the statute declares that the
lien claimant's right to the judgment amount "relates back" to the
first day of furnishing labor or materials."0 Due to the "relation
back" doctrine, the lien claimant, in this case Embree Construc-
tion, often has priority over creditors. 1 Thus, when the owner's
property is sold, the lien claimant in this situation generally re-
ceives payment first.2 Then, if any money remains after payment
of the lien claimants, other creditors are paid. 3
However, there are some instances where, in spite of the oper-
ation of the "relation back" doctrine, a lien claimant will not be
paid. 4 This is so even where judgment is properly rendered in the
lien claimant's favor.6 5 For example, where a lender extends a con-
55. See Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 32 N.C. App. 642, 647, 234 S.E. 2d 6, 9
(1977); Wilson Electric Co. v. Robinson, 15 N.C. App. 201, 189 S.E.2d 758 (1972);
Air Conditioning v. Douglass, 241 N.C. 170, 174, 84 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1954).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1989).
57. See generally Edmund T. Urban & James W. Miles, Mechanics' Liens
for the Improvement of Real Property: Recent Developments in Perfection, En-
forcement, and Priority, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283 (1976).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-10 (1989).
61. WEBSTER, supra note 5, at § 425.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See William H. Higgins, Construction Lending - General Contractor v.
Lender, 54 N.C.L.REv. 952, 953 (1976)(hereinafter Higgins).
65. Id.
[Vol. 15:77
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struction loan to the owner and simultaneously records a mortgage
deed of trust on the owner's real property, a contractor's lien will
be subordinate to the lender's deed of trust, unless the contractor
provided labor or materials to the site prior to the recordation of
the deed of trust.6 This was the situation in Embree 7 Since com-
mercial construction costs are high, real property owners will fre-
quently not begin construction without first obtaining a construc-
tion loan. 8 Thus, commercial contractors' liens are often
subordinate to the lenders' deeds of trust.6 9 Should the owner be-
come insolvent during the project, the commercial contractor may
find that outstanding debts are unrecoverable in spite of his or her
lien judgment. 0
EMBREE CONSTRUCTION'S PREDICAMENT
As the Court aptly noted, a statutory lien is of minimal value
where the owner is insolvent and the contractor's lien is
subordinate to prior encumbrances.71 In Embree v. Rafcor, UCB
had a prior recorded construction loan mortgage which would take
precedence over the contractor's lien.72 Applying the statutory
remedy to the case at hand, only after the bank had foreclosed and
received the full value of its mortgage would the contractor be en-
titled to any remaining funds 73 Additionally, even though the con-
tractor Embree did file his lien, he never perfected it.74 While
Rafcor's loan fund at UCB contained $70,000, Rafcor still owed
UCB $110,383. Embree Construction quickly recognized that once
the bank foreclosed its note there would be no money remaining
for Embree Construction. Therefore, perfection of the Lien by Em-
bree Construction would have been of little advantage or value to
them, this in addition to the expense of time and money required
to do so. Under these circumstances, Embree Construction's
nonperfection of the lien could be seen as an understandable busi-
ness decision.
Embree's situation was made all the more difficult given the
66. WEBSTER, supra note 4, § 428, at 565-66.
67. See supra note 18.
68. Higgins, supra note 64, at 953.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Embree at 493, 411 S.E.2d at 921.
72. See supra note 18.
73. Id.
74. Id.
1992]
9
Mullins: Judicial Activism Constructs Lenders' Nightmare - Embree Construc
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
fact that generally, a court will not render equitable relief where
there is or was a "full and complete remedy at law."' 75 In a similar
previous case, Jones Cooling & Heating, Inc. v. Booth,78 North
Carolina's Court of Appeals did not afford the plaintiff subcontrac-
tor the equitable remedy of restitution on its claim of unjust en-
richment as against the owner of the property. That court denied
equitable relief on the basis that, had the subcontractor utilized
his Chapter 44A remedy, he would have been given adequate re-
lief.77 It was thus apparent that Embree faced substantial uncer-
tainties as to whether or not it could anticipate payment for the
work performed on this project.
STATUS OF THE LAW AS IT EXISTED PRIOR TO EMBREE
A. Federal Cases Applying North Carolina Law
Although North Carolina's state courts have not squarely ad-
dressed the viability of a contractor's claim for an equitable lien on
funds held by a lender, Federal Courts applying and interpreting
North Carolina law had consistently rejected such claims for equi-
table relief. In the early case of Pratt Lumber Co., Inc. v. T.H. Gill
Co.,7" the court determined that an unjust enrichment theory
would not entitle the contractor to equitable relief as against the
lender or provider of funds for the project. In that case, the court
stated that materialmens' equitable assignment claims also failed.7 9
Thus, Pratt Lumber indicated that theories of unjust enrichment
or equitable assignment would not entitle a contractor-claimant to
a lien on funds held by a lender.80 In later federal cases applying
North Carolina law, the courts have further repeatedly rejected
contractors' claims based upon equitable lien theories which at-
tempted to attach funds held by lenders. In 1975, in Urban Sys-
tems Development Corp. v. NCNB Mortg. Corp.,81 the court en-
tered summary judgment for the lender after dismissing the
75. See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Guilford County, 225 N.C. 293,
300, 34 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1945).
76. 99 N.C. App. 757, 394 S.E.2d 292 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 732,
404 S.E.2d 869 (1991).
77. Id. at 760, 394 S.E.2d at 294.
78. 278 F. 783 (E.D.N.C. 1922).
79. Id. at 792.
80. Id. at 789-790.
81. 513 F.2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 15:77
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contractor's "trust fund" theory."2
The only decision in which a federal court, .applying North
Carolina law, granted a contractor's request for equitable relief
came in G.L. Wilson Bldg. Co. v. Leatherwood 3 The facts in Wil-
son, however, are distinguishable from those in Embree v. Rafcor.
In Wilson the contractor completed the project only after meeting
with the lender and receiving repeated direct assurances from the
lender that full payment would be forthcoming upon the project's
completion. 4 In Wilson the contractor received equitable relief
based upon his reliance on the lender's repeated assurances over
several meetings.8 5 In Embree v. Rafcor, however, the lender made
no such assurances to the contractor concerning payment for the
project.
In short, federal case law developed upon interpretation of
governing North Carolina law has repeatedly held that when no
assurances of payment to the contractor by the lender are made
and the contractor lacks privity with the lender, there should be no
recovery beyond that offered under Chapter 44A. Accordingly, had
the Court in Embree adhered to the principles established in ap-
plicable federal interpretations of North Carolina law, equitable
relief would have been denied in this case.86
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
While North Carolina's state courts have not directly ad-
dressed the issue of whether a contractor may state a cause of ac-
tion in seeking an equitable lien against a commercial lender, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals did address a closely-related is-
sue in Suffolk Lumber Co., Inc. v. White.8 7 In that case the Court
of Appeals held that a first-tier subcontractor was not entitled to a
claim of lien on the owner's real property.88 There the lien claim-
ant based his right of recovery upon a third-party beneficiary the-
ory. The court held that Chapter 44A did not provide an exception
to the principle that "where there is a contract between persons for
82. Id. at 1307.
83. 268 F. Supp. 609 (W.D.N.C. 1967).
84. Id. at 614.
85. Id. at 619.
86. These decisions have come from federal courts applying North Carolina
law. While these holdings have persuasive authority, they are not considered con-
trolling authority within North Carolina's State court system.
87. 12 N.C. App. 27, 182 S.E.2d 215 (1971).
88. Id.
1992]
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the furnishing of services or goods to a third person, that third
person is not liable on an implied contract simply because he re-
ceived such goods or services."8 Suffolk Lumber is similar to Em-
bree v. Rafcor in that the plaintiffs in both cases lack privity of
contract with third-party beneficiaries. Thus, under the Suffolk
Lumber rationale, Embree Construction. could not use Chapter
44A's lien remedy against UCB to attach the construction loan
fund under an equitable lien theory. Likewise, under the principles
enunciated in Suffolk Lumber, Defendants' motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) would have been proper and could have been
granted.
SUMMATION OF STATUS OF THE LAW PRIOR TO EMBREE v. RAFCOR,
INC.
As shown above, in the few instances where courts, either state
or federal, have addressed this issue, the courts have routinely de-
nied equitable relief to lien claimants.90 Prior to Embree v. Rafcor,
a contractor, not in privity with the lender, had only Chapter 44A's
relief to recover his cost of goods and services rendered to an
owner.
ANALYSIS: EMBREE V. RAFCOR, INC.
In Embree v. Rafcor, the contractor, Embree Construction,
asked the court for relief beyond that provided in Chapter 44A.91
The contractor based its request for equitable relief upon an un-
just enrichment theory.2 The lender, UCB, correctly argued that
North Carolina's federal courts had already determined that a con-
tractor's Chapter 44A remedies should not be augmented by grant-
ing equitable relief.9 3 However, the North Carolina Supreme Court
transcended the language of the mechanics' lien statute and ex-
tended equitable relief to Embree Construction. 4 In holding for
the contractor and granting equitable relief, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has perhaps opened the door to a construction liti-
gation quagmire similar to that which California has recently
89. Id. at 29, 182 S.E.2d at 216.
90. See-supra text accompanying notes 78 to 89.
91. Embree at 489, 411 S.E.2d at 918.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 487, 411 S.E.2d at 923.
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experienced.9 5
The Court held that, where a lender has received the security
it bargained for- in this case, a completed building- and refuses to
disburse to the contractor monies remaining in the construction
loan fund, that money being rightfully owed to the contractor, the
lender has been unjustly enriched at the contractor's expense. 6
When one is unjustly enriched at the expense of another, he must
make restitution to the other.9 The court may then determine
what equitable remedy is most appropriate. Here, the Court deter-
mined that equity supported Embree's right to an equitable lien
upon the undisbursed construction loan funds held by UCB.98 To
the extent of Rafcor's outstanding construction debt to Embree,
Embree held an equitable lien on the monies in the construction
loan fund held by UCB.99
The central issue in Embree v. Rafcor is whether a contractor
who is not in privity with the lender is entitled to an equitable lien
upon the undisbursed construction loan funds held by the lender
to the extent of the outstanding debt owed by the property owner
where the construction is complete. 00 Should the court decide that
a contractor is entitled to equitable relief where the construction
project is complete, a secondary, more troublesome, issue arises.
The secondary issue for the court to determine is what constitutes
"completed construction. '" 10 1 The Court dealt with these issues in
the following sequence.
The Court stated that as a general rule a contractor is limited
to Chapter 44A's relief and that there are no North Carolina state
95. See Brief for Appellant at 10, Embree Construction Group, Inc. v.
Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 411 S.E.2d 916 (1992), which discusses California's
statutory lien, its history, and eventual amendment/repeal coupled with cases ad-
dressing this statute and the surrounding circumstances in California's construc-
tion and lending industries. The cases are Nibbi Bros., Inc. v. Brannan St. Inves-
tors, 253 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1988), Familian Corp. v. Imperial Bank, 262 Cal. Rptr.
101 (4th Dist. 1989), and Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Modular Mktg. Corp.,
118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist. 1975). See also text accompanying notes 116 to 119.
96. Embree at 495 , 411 S.E.2d at 922.
97. Id. at 496, 411 S.E.2d at 923, (quoting Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567,
570, 369 S.E.2d 554, 555-56, reh'g denied, 323 N.C. 370, 373 S.E.2d 540 (1988)).
98. Id. at 501, 411 S.E.2d at 926.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 488-89, 411 S.E.2d at 918.
101. Id. at 495, 411 S.E.2d 922-23. The Court states that this is a "critical
issue," but nowhere in the opinion does the Court define "completed
construction."
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cases affording equitable relief.102 However, the Court noted that
where the owner is insolvent and there are prior encumbrances,10 3
Chapter 44A's remedy is in reality worthless.04
The Court also stated that in other jurisdictions, attempts to
reach construction loan funds have proven unsuccessful when
based on equitable assignment, third-party beneficiary, or trust
fund theories.105 Where contractors sued as third-party benefi-
ciaries of building loan agreements insured by HUD,10 the Court
noted that several federal courts granted equitable relief to con-
tractors.' Although it is apparent that HUD-insured loans should
be treated differently than loans issued through private lenders, 08
the Court did not make this distinction.
Further, the Court focused on California and Florida's treat-
ment of equitable lien claims based on theories of detrimental reli-
ance and unjust enrichment.10 9 The Court put forth California's
treatment of equitable lien claims as an appropriate way to address
this issue. 1 While focusing on California law and even noting the
unique "stop-notice" statutory provision within California's lien
102. Id. at 491-93, 411 S.E.2d at 920-22.
103. Higgins, supra note 62, at 952-55. Typically a lender will record its
mortgage deed of trust contemporaneously with the extension of the loan to the
owner. Since the owner will perhaps not contract for the construction until he is
assured that there will be sufficient funds for payment for the services, the con-
tractor's Chapter 44A lien can become subordinate to the lender's deed of trust.
In the event that the owner becomes insolovent or otherwise delinquent on his
loan, the lender may foreclose on the property and retain the loan funds and any
sales proceeds from the foreclosure sale. Sometimes there are insufficient funds
remaining to satisfy the owner's outstanding debt to the contractor. See also
supra note 20.
104. Embree at 493, 411 S.E.2d at 921.
105. Id. at 493, 411 S.E.2d at 921 (quoting Higgins, supra note 62 at 954 n.
12).
106. Embree at 493, 411 S.E.2d at 921-922. HUD stands for Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
107. Id. at 493, 411 S.E.2d at 921, citing Spring Constr. Co. v. Harris, 562
F.2d 933 (4th Cir. 1977); Trans-Bay Engineers & Builders, Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d
370 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bennett Constr. Co. v. Allen Gardens, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 825
(W.D.Mo. 1977); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 407
F. Supp. 164 (D.V.I. 1975); Travelers Indem. Co. v. First Nat'l State Bank, 328 F.
Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1971).
108. See supra note 106 where courts openly discuss the potential for a dif-
ferent outcome should the lender in question be a private lender rather than a
federal governmental lending agency.
109. Embree at 493-94, 411 S.E.2d at 921-22.
110. Id. at 494, 411 S.E.2d at 922.
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statute,"' the Court skirted the difficult question which arises in
this issue: whether North Carolina's legislature intended equitable
remedies to be allowed in addition to the remedies found in Chap-
ter 44A. California's lien statute is worded differently than North
Carolina's.' Also, the legislative history of the California lien stat-
ute indicates that California's legislature determined that equita-
ble remedies should not be granted in addition to the statutory
lien remedies.113 The Court in effect ignored North Carolina's lien
statute. Instead, the Court interpreted California's old statute.114
This decision might well be viewed as one best left for legislative
action. As Judge Greene thoughtfully articulated in his dissenting
opinion, "[o]ur Legislature has provided for liens to protect build-
ers (N.C.G.S. §§ 44A-7 et seq. (1989)), and I perceive no good rea-
son for the courts to judicially legislate additional security for the
builder." ' 5 Thus, it may be opined that the Court went beyond a
mere interpretation of our State's lien statute and that the deci-
sion in Embree amounts to something quite more than that; per-
haps an inadvertant judicial override of legislative intent.
Finally, the Court may have insufficiently addressed an impor-
tant point in the appellant's argument with regard to what consti-
tutes "completed construction." The appellant argued that, under
this new equitable lien, litigation will focus not only on the ele-
ments necessary for equitable relief, but also on whether a jobsite
is "completed construction." ' 6 Thus, this new form of relief, an
equitable lien upon a construction loan fund, litigation must first
focus on whether a jobsite is "completed construction." Then, if it
is determined that a jobsite is in fact "completed construction,"
the court will turn its attention to the issues involved in whether
an equitable lien is available. Unfortunately, the Court here may
have underestimated the significance of the appellant's argu-
111. Id. at 493-94, 411 S.E.2d at 921 n. 2.
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3264 (West 1974), which was amended due to excessive
litigation costs on the construction and lending industries, now expressly bars any
equitable remedies not enumerated in either the contract or the statute. Also,
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3156 to 3172 embodies California's unique "stop-notice" proce-
dures. North Carolina's lien statute does not have this language.
113. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3264 (West 1974).
114. Id.
115. Embree at 490, 411 S.E.2d at 919 (quoting Embree Construction Group,
Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 97 N.C.App. 418, 424, 388 S.E.2d 604, 608 (1990)(Greene, J.,
dissenting)).
116. Id. at 495, 411 S.E.2d 922-23.
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ment.117 The question of what is "completed construction" should
have been addressed by this court. However, the Court merely
stated that only on "completed construction" projects would equi-
table relief be granted." 8 In bypassing the appellant's valid ques-
tion of the definition of "completed construction," the Court may
have opened a Pandora's Box of construction litigation concerning
the sub-issue of whether a project is "complete." Since the Court
failed to clearly define "completed construction," many contractors
may well sue for an equitable lien as a standard procedure in the
quest for assurance of obtaining payment." 9 Additionally, contrac-
tors might now file suit anytime construction is arguably "com-
plete" and when there is some doubt as to whether payment from
the lender's account will be immediately forthcoming. In the end,
our court system will be subjected to the additional burden of be-
ing forced to resolve two separate issues with regard to the same
construction site. 20 The first issue to be resolved will be the deter-
mination of whether the construction is "complete" thereby deter-
mining whether an equitable lien will perhaps be available. The
second issue to be resolved will be the determination of whether an
equitable lien should attach to undisbursed construction loan
funds held by the lender. Like California and Florida, our courts
will hear construction cases where the outcome hinges upon
whether a jobsite is "completed construction." Due to the Court's
failure to properly define this term, lower courts will have to mud-
dle through the issue of "what is 'completed construction'" on
their own. There can be little doubt that the introduction of this
ambiguity will only serve to further burden the lending and con-
struction industries and introduce another element of uncertainty
in dealings between contractors, owners and lenders.
117. See Brief for Appellant at 13-15, Embree Construction Group, Inc. v.
Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 411 S.E.2d 916 (1992).
118. Embree Construction Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 487, 497, 411
S.E.2d 916, 923 (1992).
119. Nibbi Bros., Inc. v. Brannan St. Investors, 253 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1988),
Familian Corp. v. Imperial Bank, 262 Cal. Rptr. 101 (4th Dist. 1989); Boyd. &
Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Modular Mktg. Corp., 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist. 1975).
120. This situation is illustrative of the types of problems faced by California
courts in the wake of judicial decisions to create remedies beyond those outlined
in their applicable mechanic's lien statutes, and which eventually helped cause
California's legislature to revise their. State's lien statute to disallow equitable
liens. See generally supra note 119.
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CONCLUSION
In Embree v. Ra/cor, North Carolina's Supreme Court judi-
cially legislated an additional means of relief for builders. Chapter
44A's lien is no longer a builder's exclusive remedy. Now a contrac-
tor may recover under Chapter 44A's mechanic lien or seek an eq-
uitable lien. In relying upon decisions from other jurisdictions, no-
tably California, the Court failed to grapple with the differences
between California and North Carolina's lien statutes and did not
acknowledge the recent changes in California's laws regarding con-
struction liens.'"' The Court further failed to adequately outline
what should constitute a "completed construction" project for the
purpose of making this new remedy available.
Prior to this case, builders were sufficiently protected by the
lien statute and could easily contract for more security from the
owner where necessary." '2 With Embree v. Rafcor, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court failed to recognize the careful balance that our
Legislature provided in North Carolina's lien statute. With the lien
statute as a builder's sole remedy, North Carolina's construction
and lending industries have flourished. While California "and Flor-
ida lenders may decline to extend marginal loans due to potential
litigation costs, North Carolina lenders have been able to extend
loans at competitive interest rates. These loans create new con-
struction and help support our state's economy. Our Legislature
recognized that, while California's lending costs have skyrocketed
due to construction litigation costs,'2 3 North Carolina's lending
costs are minimized by maintaining Chapter 44A's lien as a
builder's exclusive remedy. Due to the holding in Embree v.
Rafcor, North Carolina lenders will tighten their lines of construc-
tion loan credit. Where a marginal loan risk would have been
granted, lenders may now deny credit to a property owner in the
face of the added uncertainties created in the wake of this deci-
sion. This could well cause an appreciable decrease in construction
projects. In that case, the holding in Embree v. Rafcor could mean
121. California's legislature, in reaction to excessive litigation due to the
holding in McBain v. Santa Clara Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1st Dist.
1966), amended the lien statute which reflects the holdings in Nibbi Bros. Inc. v.
Brannan St. Investors, 253 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1988); Familian Corp. v. Imperial
Bank, 262 Cal. Rptr. 101 (4th Dist. 1989); Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Modu-
lar Mktg. Corp., 118 Cal. Rptr. 699 (4th Dist. 1975).
122. See supra note 114.
123. See generally Nibbi Bros., Inc. v. Brannan St. Investors, 253 Cal. Rptr.
289 (1988).
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that lenders, owners, and builders alike will be adversely effected.
Just as in California, our Legislature may be compelled to correct
this ripple effect through revisions of long accepted statutory
frameworks.
DRAFTING SUGGESTIONS FOR LENDERS
A lender may be able to lessen potential liability under this
new "equitable lien on undisbursed construction loan funds" by
following some simple steps. In the mortgage agreement, the lender
should consider adding the following language:
(1) In the "security clause" state that the lender's security in-
terest runs to both the improved real property AND the undis-
bursed loan proceeds.
(2) In the "default clause" state that "default may include sit-
uations where the lender, in good faith, deems that the bwner may
default or shows signs of inability to fulfill its obligations in this
agreement."
(3) Have the owner state that he/she will require all contrac-
tors to enter into a contract whereby the contractor agrees to waive
any rights to legal or equitable liens on the improved real property,
the undisbursed construction loan funds, or proceeds from the sale
of this real property. 124 If this is unacceptable to the contractor,
the owner may wish to have the contractor limit himself to the
legal remedies provided in 44A, and forego any additional equita-
ble remedies in an attempt to limit the application of the princi-
ples enunciated in Embree.
(4) In the mortgage agreement;,. the lender should clearly de-
fine "completed construction" in favorable terms and have the
owner agree to have contractor/owner contract recite the same def-
inition for "completed construction."
These additional measures could aid in reducing a lender's po-
tential liability under the Embree v. Rafcor holding. Since the
Court seemed to focus on (a) what the lender bargained for as se-
curity interest, and (b) that the owner was not in default when the
contractor requested final payment, changing the language in the
124. See AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE LEGAL FORMs 2d Edition (1990) § 173:106,
at 489, for an excellent sample of a Form Agreement between the prospective
contractor and owner whereby the contractor agrees to not assert a mechanic's
lien. By adding language which asserts that the contractor further agrees to waive
any and all equitable liens to the undisbursed construction loan fund, the lender
substantially improves his position should litigation follow.
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mortgage agreement and the owner/contractor's contract may elim-
inate any "equitable lien" liability.
Philip A. Mullins, IV
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